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Equation (3) makes it clear that, when working on elasticity, the crucial
question is how shifts in F translate themselves into shifts in ©: that is,
how changes in income distribution a®ect the income distribution of market
demand (or its Lorenz curve). We now turn to the case where an exogenous
shock generates a fosd shift to the income distribution.
3 First order stochastic dominance
In this section we enquire about the e®ects of a fosd shock to the income
distribution: hence, we interpret µ as an index of fosd and impose that
Fµ(y; µ) · 0 for all y 2 Y (with strict inequality somewhere), which implies
that aggregate (average) income is increasing in µ, ¹µ(µ) > 0. As individual
demand q(p; y) is increasing in income y, this also immediately implies that
Qµ(p; µ) > 0: not surprisingly, a fosd shock increases demand at all prices.
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But how about elasticity? In principle, there is no reason to expect
that Robinson's assumption on preferences (an increase in individual income
a®ects negatively the price elasticity of individual demand) delivers a negative
relationship between aggregate income and the price elasticity of market
demand. The following example shows that an increase in mean income may
leave market elasticity unaltered, even though the elasticity of individual
demand is decreasing in individual income.
Let the consumer's demand for commodity q be
q(p; y) = max
½
1¡ p
y
; 0
¾
such that its elasticity (whenever the consumer buys the commodity) is
´(p; y) = p=(y ¡ p), which is positive and clearly decreasing in income.4 Let
now the latter be distributed across consumers as a standard exponential,
f(y; µ) = e¡(y¡µ)
with ym = µ and yM = 1. An increase in µ > 0 amounts to a fosd shock,
which increases linearly aggregate (mean) income.5 We show in the Appendix
that in this case the aggregate demand function takes the form
Q(p; µ) = G(p)eµ
3For a simple proof, see e.g. Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, ch.3).
4This demand function can be rationalized as deriving from a separable utility function
(see, e.g., Tirole, 1989, p.144).
5Indeed, it is easily seen that ¹(µ) = 1 + µ, and that Fµ(y; µ) = ¡e¡y+µ < 0.
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for any p > µ: there follows trivially that Hµ(p; µ) = 0: an increase in mean
income has no e®ect on the price elasticity of market demand. The same
Appendix also presents a simple general argument, to the e®ect that a shock
being fosd does not ensure that the sign of the individual relationship be-
tween elasticity and income carries over to the aggregate relationship between
market elasticity and mean income.
3.1 Elasticity and the income distribution of demand
A preliminary step is now required to see how µ may a®ect the income distri-
bution of demand. This involves considering Esteban's (1986) income share
elasticity, de¯ned as follows
¼(y; µ) = lim
h!0
d log
³
1
¹
R y+h
y
xf(x; µ)dx
´
d log y
= 1 +
yfy(y; µ)
f(y; µ)
(6)
The function ¼ measures the percentage change in the share of income ac-
cruing to class y, brought about by a marginal increase y. Esteban shows
that there is a one-to-one relationship between any given income density and
the corresponding income share elasticity, so that the former can be charac-
terized in terms of the latter. Given that, a natural question is what is the
relationship between a fosd shock to the distribution, and the behaviour
of the corresponding income share elasticity. In this respect, the following
proposition is noteworthy:
Proposition 2 Let µ be a continuous shift to the density f(y; µ), such that
Fµ(ym; µ) = 0. If ¼µ(y; µ) > 0 for all y 2 Y , then µ is a fosd variable, i.e.
Fµ(y; µ) · 0 for all y 2 Y (strictly somewhere).
Proof. To ease notation, let s(y; µ) = fµ(y; µ)=f(y; µ), with f(y; µ) > 0
for all y 2 Y . Simple di®erentiation then shows that ¼µ(y; µ) = ysy(y; µ),
so that ¼µ(y; µ) > 0 means that s(y; µ) is monotonically increasing in y for
any given µ. Now notice that by de¯nition Fµ(yM ; µ) =
R yM
ym
s(y; µ)f(y; µ)dy
= 0: as f(y; µ) > 0 and the overall integral is nil, s(y; µ) has to take on both
negative and positive values. Since s(y; µ) is increasing in y, the (negative)
minimum of s occurs at y = ym and, by the same token, s(yM ; µ) > 0 is
a maximum for s: there is a unique value by of y such that s(by; µ) = 0.
Consider now the function Fµ(y; µ) =
R y
ym
fµ(y; µ)dy, the ¯rst derivative of
which is fµ(y; µ) = s(y; µ)f(y; µ). Clearly, signffµ(y; µ)g = signfs(y; µ)g,
and fµ(y; µ) vanishes at by which is the unique minimum for Fµ(y; µ). Since
s(y; µ) is negative (positive) for y near ym (yM) so will be fµ(y; µ): Fµ(y; µ)
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points down (up) around ym (yM). As Fµ(ym; µ) = Fµ(yM ; µ) = 0, Fµ(y; µ)
lies below the zero line: µ is then a fosd parameter.
Under the assumption that a shock on µ does not a®ect the lower bound of
the support of the distribution, the proof takes advantage of the fact that if µ
raises the income share elasticity, the µ-elasticity of the density (equivalently,
the function s) must be increasing in income, and negative for low income
levels.
Proposition 2 is the key to the paper's main result, to the e®ect that the
condition ¼µ(y; µ) > 0 is actually su±cient for the Robinson e®ect to take
place. To see this, notice that, given (3), the derivative of market elasticity
H with respect to µ is clearly,
Hµ(p; µ) =
Z yM
ym
´(p; y)'µ(y; p; µ)dy
Integrating by parts one obtains
Hµ(p; µ) = ¡
Z yM
ym
´y(p; y)©µ(y; p; µ)dy (7)
indeed, a crucial piece of information is obviouly how individual elasticity
´(p; y) reacts to y.
Looking at (7), one may rely exclusively on Robinson's assumption that
´y(¢; y) < 0 to draw the conclusion that Hµ(¢; µ) < 0, whenever one can
safely assert that ©µ(y; ¢; µ) · 0 for all y (with strict inequality somewhere).
In other words: it is enough to know that individual elasticity is such that
´y(¢; y) < (>)0 to conclude that Hµ(¢; µ) < (>)0, when a fosd shock to
F (y; µ) translates into a fosd shock to ©(y; ¢; µ): monotonicity of the indi-
vidual relationship is then enough to sign the aggregate relationship. How-
ever, ©(p; y; µ) depends on preferences via the individual demand curve, so
that a given shock to F does not necessarily translate into a shock of the
same type to ©: in fact, we are interested on what restriction on F only are
such that this occurs. As the following proposition establishes, it turns out
that one such restriction is that the income share elasticity be raised by an
increase in µ { which obviously raises mean income.
Proposition 3 Assume Fµ(ym; µ) = 0. If ¼µ(y; µ) > 0, then ©µ · 0 for all
y 2 Y .
Proof. The proof is straightforward, by noting that Proposition 2 can
also be applied to the income distribution of demand: if the corresponding
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Esteban elasticity is raised by an increase in µ, then a change in µ is a fosd
shift to ©(y; p; µ). Let such elasticity be denoted by b¼(y; p; µ): it is easily
checked that
b¼(y; p; µ) = 1 + y'y(y; p; µ)
'(y; p; µ)
= "(y; p) + ¼(y; µ) (8)
where "(y; p) is the income elasticity of demand. There follows that ¼µ(y; µ) >
0 implies b¼µ(y; µ) > 0 and hence µ is a fosd variable for both F and ©, since
Fµ(ym; µ) implies trivially ©µ(ym; p; µ) = 0.
It should be stressed that ¼µ is positive in many, well known and widely
used cases, where it is associated with the densities intersecting only once
following a shock on µ. Moreover, this property is a well known feature (in
an obviously di®erent context) of many contract theoretic models, where it
is known as `monotone likelihood ratio property' (e.g., Hart and HolstrÄom,
1987).6
By Proposition 3, if the distributive shock on µ has no e®ect on the income
share elasticity, there is no e®ect on the price elasticity of market demand
{ incidentally, this is what happens in the previous example, since for the
exponential distribution ¼(y; µ) = 1¡ y, independent of µ.7 The economics
behind this result can be put as follows. It is obvious that aggregate price
elasticity is an average of individual elasticities, weighted by the individual
demand share on total demand. A fosd shock increases market demand (as
agents are on average richer), but does not necessarily increase the weight
of high income (low elasticity) classes vis µa vis that of low income (high
elasticity) classes: for this to happen, the increase in the density of high
income classes must be such that their demand increases more than aggregate
demand: that is, 'µ(¢; p; µ) > 0. This implies that for some other classes,
'µ(¢; p; µ) < 0, while for at least one value of y it will be 'µ(¢; p; µ) = 0
(since obviously
R yM
ym
'µ(y; p; µ)dy = 0). Given this, a decrease in aggregate
elasticity is clearly to be had whenever 'µ(¢; p; µ) is monotonically increasing
in y, i.e. the shock raises the high income (and decreases the low-income)
6The property ¼µ > 0 (µ being an appropriately de¯ned fosd shift variables) holds for
distributions such as Pareto, lognormal, Beta, and Gamma. The implication of MLRP is
apparent when recalling, from Proposition 2, that ¼µ > 0 implies that s(y; µ) is increasing
in y:
7In the example we also have, contrary to the assumptions in Proposition 3, Fµ(ym; µ) =
¡1 6= 0. Referring to the proof of Proposition 2, this is implied by ¼ being independent of
µ, since the latter means that the µ-elasticity of the density is independent of income. In
fact, for the exponential distribution this elasticity equals µ: hence fµ(¢; µ) = f(¢; µ), and
Fµ(yM ; µ) = Fµ(ym; µ) +
R yM
ym
fµ(¢; µ)dy = 0 requires Fµ(ym; µ) = ¡1.
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demand share; on the other hand, Proposition 2 tells us that a necessary and
su±cient condition for the µ-elasticity of any density to be monotonically
increasing in y, is that the corresponding income share elasticity be raised
by µ. Hence if b¼µ is positive, 'µ is indeed increasing in y.
4 Concluding remarks
The e®ects of income distribution on market demand are generally studied
under the assumption that prices be given { the main focus being on Engel
curves, consumption patterns and the size of the market (e.g., Lambert and
PfÄahler, 1997). However, the link with price elasticity should in principle
also matter, as elasticity is crucial to the ¯rms' choices and market structure
(Benassi et al., 2002b). Clearly, the crucial obstacle to this kind of anal-
ysis is that the relationship between market demand elasticity and income
distribution depends heavily on preferences.
The premise of this paper is that it is anyway useful to know to what ex-
tent the link between income distribution and the price elasticity of demand
is a®ected by speci¯c assumptions about preferences. In this respect, our
main result is that there exist restrictions on the shape of the income distri-
bution (holding for a wide class of functional forms), such that the `Robinson
e®ect' operates { that is, the sign of the income-elasticity link at the aggre-
gate level is the same as that dictated by preferences at the individual level,
whenever the increase in aggregate income is due to a ¯rst-order, stochastic
dominance shock to the distribution of income. For example, one practical
consequence of this is that, when individual price elasticity is decreasing in
income, one such shock is bound to raise the ¯rms' market power in a tradi-
tional Cournot setting, whenever it also raises the income share elasticity at
all income classes.
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